This book examines a question generally neglected in the study of international relations: why does a militarily and economically less powerful state initiate war against a relatively strong state? T.V.Paul analyzes this phenomenon by focusing on the strategic and political considerations, domestic and international, which influence a weaker state to launch war against a more powerful adversary. The key argument of deterrence theory is that the military superiority of the status quo -power, coupled with a credible retaliatory threat, will prevent attack by challengers. The author challenges this position by examining six twentieth-century asymmetric wars: the Japanese offensive against Russia in 1904; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941; the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950; the Pakistani offensive in Kashmir in 1965; the Egyptian offensive in the Sinai in 1973; and the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. The book's findings have wide implications for the...