Firms practice poaching of their rival's customers inmarkets where they are able to identify between their own customersand those of the rivals. This practice results in inefficientlyhigh switching. In some of these markets firms also use strategies thatmake poaching by rival firms harder. Dr. Heisnam Singh explores thepractice of firms requiring customers to sign contracts that areof pre-specified duration specifying early termination charges. Ifcontract with breach penalty is available, firms find it privatelyoptimal to use it. However when all firms use it they are worse off andresults in lower than efficient switching. Consumers may be better offor worse off. Dr. Singh also examines the pricing decision of atypical firm that sells more than one product in markets where productsare strategic complements and the firms have some market power. Hefind empirical evidence using data from the US wholesalemarket for unbranded gasoline that a firm internalizes thestrategic complementarities when optimally choosing its prices.